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Abstract: Value Added Tax (VAT) is one of the main sources of internal 
revenues in Peru and most countries in Latin America.
Since the market in Peru shows a high heterogeneity in terms of fi rms’ size 
and their economic transactions, it is not profi table to collect VAT from the 
smallest-sized fi rms or audit them. Therefore, there is a powerful incen-
tive for evaders to create small-sized fi rms deliberately with the only aim 
of issuing invoices that do not support real transactions and selling them 
for a fraction of their nominal amount. Some big-sized fi rms “purchase” 
these invoices to overstate costs and reduce the VAT to be paid.
Peru’s Tax Administration Service (STA, for its acronym in Spanish) is 
a public agency in charge of the collection and audits on internal reve-
nues, and the Detailed Transactions Report (DTR) is a VAT’s enforcement
mechanism aimed to fi ght against this kind of VAT evasion.
The DTR is mandatory and the STA is able to impede commercial
operations of any taxpayer that does not deliver it on time. However,
since the number of small-sized fi rms in the market is large, but their
average transactions are not considerable, the STA demands DTR only to 
big-sized fi rms.
The objective of this article is to prove that a VAT’s enforcement mecha-
nism, partially sett led as in this case, becomes a perverse incentive for tax 
evaders to continue issuing and purchasing invoices that do not support 
real transactions.
We propose that requiring all taxpayers to submit DTR under the VAT’s 
scope, will discourage this kind of evasion since reporting the DTR
implies collusion’s costs and a higher risk of being bett er controlled
or audited.
Keywords: Value Added Tax (VAT) / tax avoidance / perverse incentive to evasion
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 INTRODUCTION
Value Added Tax (VAT) is an indirect tax that applies only to the added-
value of a good or service and constitutes one of the most important sources 
of the Government’s income in Peru and many other countries around 
the world. VAT law requires taxpayers to record detailed transactions in 
accounting books and support each transaction with a corresponding 
authorized invoice.
Das-Gupta and Gang (1996) consider that VAT has an important 
advantage over other sales taxes. They point out that the existence of 
purchase and sales invoices produces “self-enforcement”, e.g., sellers 
would want to set a lower price than the sales price on the invoice so they 
may pay less tax, but buyers would want a higher price than the sales 
price so they may pay less tax.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assure that tax evasion may be seen as 
a gamble, they state that any rational individual is viewed as maximizing 
the expected utility of this gamble, weighting the benefi ts of successful 
cheating against the risky prospect of detection and punishment, and the 
individual pays taxes because he is afraid of gett ing caught and penalized 
if he does not report truthfully. This “portfolio” approach gives as a result 
that compliance depends upon audit and fi ne rates.
Alm (2012) affi  rms that Allingham and Sandmo (1972) focus exclusively 
on the fi nancial incentives of the evasion gamble, and on the idea that 
individuals pay taxes only because they fear detection and punishment, 
but for many observers it is evident that compliance cannot be entirely 
explained by such purely fi nancial considerations, especially those 
generated by the level of enforcement. Indeed, they insist taxpayers are 
also infl uenced by the social context in which, and the process by which, 
decisions are made; and they are motivated not simply by self-interests, 
but also by group notions like social norms, social customs, fairness, 
trust, reciprocity, tax morale, and even patriotism, as well as by individual 
notions of guilt, shame, morality, altruism, or alienation.
Franzoni (1999) defi nes compliance with tax law as a decision, 
meaning four elements: (i) accurate tax base reporting, (ii) correct liability 
calculation, (iii) timely fi ling of tax statements, and (iv) timely payment
of the amounts due.
Mitt one (2002) points out that VAT evasion usually involves three 
agents: the seller, the buyer and the Government. Interaction among these 
three agents may give rise to the following phenomena: the buyer of a 
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given good or service, may evade only if he is able to collude with the 
seller, who should behave as a tax collector for the Government. Collusion 
between the seller and the buyer would benefi t both since they may reduce 
their burdens. The buyer would overstate costs, decreasing net payments, 
and the seller would not pay the VAT.
Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2011) fi nd that many small-sized fi rms 
in Latin America operate informally because they are not productive 
enough to cover fi xed cost. Indeed, informal economy in Peru is certainly 
colossal and its transactions while real are obviously made without the 
support of legal invoices. However, in this work we focus specifi cally 
on the problem caused when buyers overstate costs using invoices from 
sellers that do not pay the VAT; these invoices are legal, but transactions 
were never completed, and the corresponding tax was never paid. Most 
of the time these small-sized fi rms are created with the only purpose of 
issuing invoices not supported on real transactions1. This is by far the 
most common method to evade VAT in Peru and one of the most common 
practices used in South America.
Precisely, heterogeneity in the fi rms’ size is an important issue in most 
developing countries. Figure 1 shows revenues by taxpayers’ size in Peru. 
There is a notorious concentration of revenues in few taxpayers; more 
specifi cally, those denominated “Main Taxpayers” reach 13,706 or only 
0.3% of the total number of taxpayers, but represent 82% of total revenues.
Usually, the biggest-sized fi rms are taxed on time, bett er controlled, 
regularly audited, and their remaining tax payments bett er enforced when 
necessary; however, it is more diffi  cult and expensive to do the same for 
the large number of small-sized taxpayers.
There are 559,706 taxpayers under the VAT’s scope in Peru. They sell 
and purchase goods and they may legally issue invoices which are used 
as credit for the VAT; however, most of them (546 thousand or 98%) are just 
medium and small-sized fi rms, barely controlled.
Since it is costly and diffi  cult to enforce tax payments from small-sized 
fi rms, Peru’s Tax Administration Service (STA) is continuously looking for 
lower-cost and more eff ective mechanisms. Hence, STA does not use costly 
seizures and audits for them, but other faster and lower-cost techniques. 
Unfortunately, the latt er cannot legally determine major changes in their 
accounting (e.g. to prove that some transactions did not actually occur).
1 Once they are detected they just stop their operations and disappear.
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When a medium or small-sized seller does not pay the VAT, the 
STA may suspect that part or all of its transactions do not support real 
transactions, but there is not more prior information to prove it. Besides, 
most of the time auditing a small-sized fi rm has a negative cost/benefi t. 
For the same reason, auditing the buyer would be desirable only when the 
added amount of suspicious transactions2 makes it profi table. Therefore, 
small-sized evaders may continue operating for long time before being 
caught and/or punished.
Das-Gupta and Gang (1996) introduce the “Transactions Matching” 
technique to the conventional analysis. They point out that for VAT the 
matching of purchase and sale invoices is an important enforcement 
technique. Furthermore, they assure that transactions’ matching has 
proved to have very diff erent eff ects from auditing, and even when 
auditing alone is unable to induce non-zero taxpayer reports, a suitable 
intensive transaction matching may induce truthful reporting.
2 Including other transactions with other small-sized taxpayers that do not pay 
VAT. 
Figure 1: Tax Revenues concentration in Peru by size of Taxpayers 
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208 Taxpayers: 13.2% of total revenues
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Obviously, a tax enforcement mechanism may represent an additional 
barrier or cost of entry into a market. Indeed, Auriol and Warlters (2005) 
assure that informal economy in developing countries is largely a result of 
high fi xed formal sector entry costs. However, despite the likely long-term 
negative eff ects of enforcement mechanisms on informality, we focus 
exclusively on the incentives that a mechanism like the DTR provides
to VAT’s compliance.
The Detailed Transactions Report (DTR) is a transaction-matching 
program established by Peru’s Tax Administration Service (STA) that 
requires an important group of Peruvian taxpayers to deliver an annual 
database with sales and purchases detailed by clients and providers; this 
report is additional to the required annual tax statement3. Specifi cally, the 
DTR makes necessary the collusion between buyers and sellers, increasing 
the systemic risk as the number of taxpayers required also increase.
The DTR has to be delivered sometime after the annual VAT’s statement, 
and those taxpayers who do not deliver it on time are fi ned, then those 
who do not deliver it after being fi ned are forbidden to continue operating.




Sales Purchases Total 
Sales
Total 
PurchasesTo USD From USD
A
C 80
B 100 150 100
D 70
B A 100 - 0 100 0
C
D 70 A 80
120 100
E 50 D 20
D
C 20 A 70
170 160E 60 C 70
F 90 G 20
……. …….. …….. …….. ……..
There are two fi rms A and B, both required to report the DTR, and the 
STA totalizes all amounts reported to detect various modalities of VAT’s 
3 Which one does not have detailed but just totalized amounts?
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evasion, but the most important data comes from comparing the total 
sums for each taxpayer with respect to its annual statement.
Table N° 2 shows that when we take a larger number of taxpayers, DTR 
becomes a powerful tool to detect VAT’s fraud. Nevertheless, if a fi rm 
reports the DTR, but some of its clients and/or providers are not required 
to report it, it is not possible to match those specifi c transactions; e.g., if we 
do not demand DTR to taxpayers E, F and G, we will not be sure if: sales 
of taxpayers C and D, purchases of taxpayer D and sales and purchases of 
taxpayers E, F and G are accurate.
With this information, it is inferred that it would be diffi  cult that 
taxpayers C and D report more sales than those they eff ectively
made; we also may be tempted to think that if taxpayer G did not pay
its VAT then taxpayer D could be overstating costs with credit not 
supported by real transactions. However, we do not have more prior 
information to confi rm it.
Table 2











A 150 150 100 100
B 100 100 0 0
C 70 120 100 100
D 20 170 140 160
In Peru, the STA requires only 60 thousand taxpayers to report the 
DTR (a small percentage considering that approximately 560 thousand 
report the annual VAT’s statement). Reporting taxpayers were and are still 
chosen based on their size which is highly correlated with their sales and 
purchases importance.
It should be clear that not paying VAT when due does not necessarily 
mean that a small- sized fi rm is issuing fake invoices. Indeed, it may be 
a simple lack of enforcement. However, VAT’s evasion is around 34%4 in 
Peru and this is the reason why it should be considered as a serious issue. 
4 Measured by the IMF and the World Bank, it means that STA is not collecting 34% 
of the potential VAT.
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Graetz , Reinganum and Wilde (1986) state that the main condition for 
the STA to audit is that the increase of revenues associated to uncovering 
a non-complier must exceed the audit cost. Since the STA may not have 
positive benefi ts on auditing when the amount of the probable non-real 
purchases is not enough to cover, at least, audit costs, there are incentives 
for the taxpayers to evade by splitt ing purchases to medium and small-
sized providers who issue invoices that do not support real transactions.
If the list of taxpayers under VAT’s scope is especially heterogeneous 
that most of them execute transactions for amounts that would not justify 
audits, and the STA cannot enforce regular VAT payments from all of 
them, at least three of the four elements mentioned by Franzoni (1999) to 
assure tax compliance, should not be considered.
The DTR aims to improve VAT’s compliance in two diff erent ways: 
fi rst, by directly improving compliance due to the additional controls over 
those required to report5 and second, by indirectly improving compliance 
as being informed in detail by other taxpayers’ forces, then each taxpayer 
could report accurately to avoid an audit.
If the STA required DTR to all taxpayers under VAT’s scope and 
performed a total collection process, the possibility of VAT’s evasion 
would be considerably smaller. However, the DTR improves compliance 
only of those taxpayers whose providers and clients are all required, too. 
Therefore, fi rms have an incentive to overstate costs by splitt ing purchases 
to small-sized fi rms not required to deliver the DTR.
Even though a perfect tax collection may not be achieved, it is still 
possible to use the DTR as a tool to expulse those taxpayers whose only 
objective is issuing fake invoices from the system; e.g., if taxpayer G is 
issuing fake invoices, demanding DTR to G will obligate G to provide 
detailed information of all its “transactions”. Then, it is very likely that 
if G is providing invoices not supported on real transactions, it will not 
report DTR, then the STA will be likely to fi ne and close it. Nevertheless, 
if G delivers DTR, increased risk and collusion costs play now major roles 
in its decision to evade.
Finally, since the intention of this article is only to prove that partially 
sett led enforcement mechanisms have indeed negative eff ects on tax 
compliance, we do not analyze their economic eff ects on productivity or 
effi  ciency which can be certainly negative and may stimulate informality.
5 Not delivering the DTR implies fi nes and closures.
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THE MODEL
We set a Game Theory Model in which there exist two active players: an 
Oligopolist and the STA; fi rm “m” is a passive player but will play actively 
in the extended version of this model. The Oligopolist (the purchaser) is a 
big-sized fi rm required to report the DTR, but its provider (the seller) “m” 
is a small-sized fi rm that is not required.
This is a game of incomplete information in which nature determines 
fi rst the probability that any small-sized fi rm like “m” is issuing invoices 
that do not support real transactions or the percentage of fi rms like “m” 
doing that. In the meantime, collusion between the Oligopolist and “m” is 
not necessary since the STA cannot match their transactions.
The Oligopolist reports detailed purchases to “m” through the DTR, but 
the STA cannot match this information and suspects that the purchaser 
may be overstating costs since “m” did not paid VAT when due. However, 
the only way to prove evasion would be through auditing.
According to Alm (2012) there is no defi nitive explanation on why 
small or big-sized fi rms are willing to evade, and an att empting to provide 
one will clearly surpasses the scope and purpose of this article. Thus, 
we assume there are some small and big-sized fi rms willing to evade6. 
We will study the incentives that an enforcement mechanism like the 
DTR provides to them. This conveys us to assume that fi rms have pre-
determined or exogenous probabilities of being evaders.
The basic assumptions of the model are:
The Oligopolist, due to the amount of its transactions, is always
required to report the DTR while the competitive fi rm “m” that sells 
inputs to the Oligopolist, is not.
In general, these sellers (small sized fi rms) do not pay taxes when due, 
but just some of them issue invoices that do not support real transactions7.
Taxpayers are risk-averse while STA is risk-neutral.
  is the tax rate of a Value-Added-Tax 0 1  
6 This characteristic agrees exactly with empirical observations.
7 There is not a clear account of how many of these small-sized fi rms that do not pay 
VAT when due are created just for issuing invoices that do not support real tran-
sactions. However, as we said before, VAT’s evasion is around 34% of its potential 
base according to 2009 estimates .
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Since it is costly, STA may enforce VAT payments of the Oligopolist, 
but not of all small-sized fi rms like “m”. A representative competitive fi rm 
“m” which sells inputs to the Oligopolist is such that:
m mx P x M( )   (1)
Where:
xm is “m”’s output,  xm > 0
P(xm) is the price of xm without tax
xm P(xm) is “m”’s tax base. It will be called M
Firm “m” is a perfect competitor that may eventually sell all its 
production to only one purchaser (the Oligopolist).
On the other hand, an Oligopolist sells fi nal products and
its tax base is:
x P x( )  (2)
All transactions are standardized to the unit.
  is the probability that any fi rm “m”’s sales do not support real 
transactions or the percentage of small-sized fi rms like “m” issuing these 
invoices, 0 1   .
  is the probability that a “dishonest” Oligopolist “buys” from “m” 
or the percentage of Oligopolists buying from “m” when “m” is issuing 
invoices that do not support real transactions, 0 1   .
  is the probability that an “honest” Oligopolist “buys” from “m” or 
the percentage of Oligopolists buying from “m” when “m” issues invoices 
that support real transactions. Henceforth, and without changes in the 
development and conclusions of this article, we assume that 1  or that 
an honest Oligopolist always purchases from “m” when “m” is issuing 
invoices that do support real transactions. Alternatively, when some of 
all fi rms type “m” issue invoices supporting real transactions, all of the 
“honest” Oligopolists in the market purchase from them.
  is the percentage of M that a fi rm “m” issuing invoices that do 
support real transactions would collect for selling them, it is produced by 
the agreement of buyers and sellers8, and it implies:
M M  
8 Empirical evidence from most audits suggests that θ is around 1 or 2 percentage 
points above τ, so that we consider it a parameter
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Then:
    (3)
Equation (3) means that what “m” expects to be paid for these invoices 
must be greater than the amount it would have to pay if audited. In other 
words this is “m”’s minimum incentive to cheat. In order to simplify, 
henceforth invoices that do not support real transactions will be called 
“fake invoices”9.
  is the STA’s fi xed probability of auditing/detecting10 VAT’s
evasion 0 1  
The STA has limited resources and it may audit only some big-sized 
fi rms; moreover, since the amount of transactions are in general small, and 
the Oligopolists are used to have minor percentages of their purchases 
from small-sized fi rms11, we assume that auditing any Oligopolist due to 
these suspicious transactions reports approximately the same expected 
benefi t to the STA. Therefore, the probability of being audited by this 
reason is exogenous and fi xed.
F is the fi ne that the STA imposes to the Oligopolist when it detects 
invoices are fake.
F M    (4)
Where F > 0
Notice that the STA fi rst observes the purchases to fi rm “m” reported 
in detail by the Oligopolist, and notice that “m” did not pay VAT; however, 
it is not sure if these transactions are fake, then a conjecture (belief)
should be designed about the nature of “m”’s sales to decide if the 
Oligopolist is audited or not.
There is a fi xed cost of auditing, named “a”
First, nature determines if fi rm “m” issues fake invoices or the 
percentage of fi rms like “m” is doing the same. Then, the Oligopolist 
decides whether to buy from “m” or not (detailed-reporting-collusion is 
not necessary since “m” does not report DTR).
9 Indeed, these invoices are real and authorized by the STA, there are also “fake” 
or not authorized invoices in the market, but they constitute a small percentage of 
STA’s fi nds.
10 We assume that auditing allows the STA to detect evasion in all cases.
11 However, the totalized amounts of these suspicious purchases are very
important.
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Finally, the STA observes detailed purchases of the Oligopolist to 
“m”, then it makes conjectures about the nature of these transactions and 
decides to audit or not.
The Game Tree is:
Nature determines m’s behavior
        Figure 2: Structure of the game
Where:
 : is the probability that “m”’s sales are fake or the percentage of fi rms 
like “m” sells fake invoices
O: is the Oligopolist
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p: Is the percentage of Oligopolists who may decide to evade or the 
probability that an Oligopolist is “dishonest”.
1-p: is the percentage of Oligopolists who decide not to evade under 
any circumstance or the probability that an Oligopolist is “honest”.
S: is the STA that does not know (before auditing) if purchases repor-
ted are based on real transactions or not.
 : is the Probability that a dishonest Oligopolist purchases to the pro-
vider or the percentage of these Oligopolists that purchases from 
fi rm “m” when “m” is issuing fake invoices.
 : is the Probability that an honest Oligopolist purchases to the provi-
der or the percentage of Oligopolists that purchases from fi rm “m” 
when “m” is issuing real invoices.
The tree shows that the probability of purchasing fake invoices given 
that the Oligopolist is honest, is zero 0( ).   
For the same reason, and in order to simplify the analysis without 
aff ecting our fi nal results, we assume that a dishonest Oligopolist has zero 
purchase probability (p=0) from “m” given that “m” issues real invoices.
Finally, in the case of the honest Oligopolist, a purchase probability 
from “m” given that invoices are real, is one 1( ).   
 : is the fi xed probability of audit explained before.
Notice that this is a dynamic game with incomplete information 
(payoff s unknown) but following Harsanyi (1967) it is possible to solve it 
as a game with imperfect information (history unknown)
In this case nature reveals the type of “m” to the Oligopolist, but does 
not reveal it to the STA, then we may model this game as of imperfect 
information since at the time the STA has to play, it does not know if 
purchases reported by the Oligopolist are real or not.
Shaded area on the tree graphic shows the STA’s information set I.
The STA needs to determine whether to audit or not the Oligopolist 
and then it needs fi rst to make an assumption about the Distribution of 
Oligopolists according to their probability of buying from “m” given “m” 
is issuing fake invoices.
Assumptions using Bayes’ rule are:





   
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μ: is the probability that an Oligopolist “purchases” from a provider 
given that this provider is issuing “fake invoices”. It refl ects STA’s 




1 1 p( )
 
 
   
1-μ: is STA’s conjecture of the probability that an Oligopolist who is not 
willing to purchase fake invoices, purchases from a provider given 
that this provider is issuing real invoices.
A: is the STA’s action of Auditing 
N: is the STA’s action of not auditing
B: is the Oligopolist’s action of Purchasing from “m” 
D: is the Oligopolist’s action of Not Purchasing from “m”
Table N° 3 shows Marginal benefi ts of the players.
Rows represent Oligopolist’s strategies and columns the STA’s 
strategies.
(Bp;  ) is the Dishonest Oligopolist’s decision of purchasing from “m” 
given that “m” is issuing fake invoices.
(B1-p; 1  ) is the Honest Oligopolist’s decision of purchasing from “m” 
given that “m” is issuing real invoices.
(Dp;  ) is the Dishonest Oligopolist’s decision of Not purchasing from 
“m” given that “m” is issuing fake invoices.
(D1-p;  ) is the Honest Oligopolist’s decision of Not purchasing from 
“m” given that “m” is issuing fake invoices.
FINDING PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA
STA’s expected payoff  from choosing A (audit) is:
1xP x F M a xP x M a( ) ( ) ( ) ( )               
From choosing N (Not audit) is:
xP x M( )    




   
(5)
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If the dishonest Oligopolist has “bought” fake invoices from “m”, 






This expression shows the minimum amount that justifi es an audit for 
the STA.
However, we stated that amounts like M are too small that do not 




   
(6)
If equation (6) holds then the STA’s best choice is “N” which





If the STA chooses not to audit then the Dishonest Oligopolist has to 
choose between B and D.
 In case of choosing B, the expected benefi t is:
1 1p xP x M( ) ( ) ( )           
If choosing D is:
1p xP x( ) ( )      
If we assume that B>D:
1 1p xP x M( ) ( ) ( )             > 
1p xP x( ) ( )      
1 0M( )    
Implying that:
1 0    (7)
Or that:
M > 0 (8)
Equation (7) implies that for each transaction, after paying the tax, 
the margin must be greater than the payment made to fi rm “m” for 
issuing fake invoices. Since this equation supports Oligopolist’s cheating 
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decision12 we will assume this is true henceforth. For the same reason, 
equation (8) holds to support this profi le.
Thus, in this particular case, given that the STA chose not to audit, a 
Dishonest Oligopolist will choose B.




   
Or that:
a F M( )    (9)
Equation (9) is equal to our assumption stated in (6). Therefore, the 
Profi le (B,N) is a PBE if equation (8) holds.
This unique PBE means that the Dishonest Oligopolist chooses 
purchasing from “m” given that “m” is issuing fake invoices, and the STA 
chooses not to audit.
This equilibrium predicts that a Dishonest Oligopolist will prefer to 
split purchases to medium or small-sized providers like “m” that issue 
fake invoices and are not required to deliver DTR, and the STA will choose 
not to audit since the audit cost is greater than the expected increase in 
revenues of detecting fake transactions (fi ne plus tax)
The only policy rule the STA may use in this equilibrium is “F”13; the 
other way of making profi table an audit would be by reducing its cost 
which may create a trade-off  between quality and effi  ciency. 
EXTENSION TO THE ORIGINAL MODEL
It would be interesting to explore an extension to the original model in 
which DTR is required to all fi rms under VAT’s scope to determine if there 
are positive eff ects on compliance after doing it. 
All fi rms (including those like “m”) are required now to deliver the 
DTR. Then, there is a collusion cost added to the game:
M cM M(     (10)
12 A dishonest Oligopolist would not pay more for a fake invoice than the eventual 
margin after tax on it.
13 In Peru as in most countries of Latin America moving the tax rate is not a policy 
controlled by the STA
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Equation (10) shows the net benefi t of issuing fake invoices for a 
determined provider “m”; the left-hand side shows its benefi t (payment) 
and the right-hand side shows its cost.
We have c > 0 as the cost of collusion for “m” when required to 
deliver DTR and assume that the cost of collusion for the Oligopolist is 
incorporated in .  Then, following (10), the original condition (3) turns to:
c     (11)
Equation (11) shows the new minimum incentive to cheat.
There are now three active players in the game, and the STA may still 
audit the Oligopolist, but not “m” since it is expensive. However, after 
auditing the Oligopolist it may fi ne both taxpayers in case of fake invoices.
The Game Tree is still the same but now the fi rst move is made by 
“m” since it has now the alternative of choosing between issuing fake or 
unreal invoices (U) with probability “ ” or issuing real invoices (R) with 
probability “1  ”.
Even though “m” is required to deliver the DTR it does not pay VAT 
when due and this is the reason why the STA suspects transactions may 
be fake.
Since “m” does not pay VAT when due, if the STA audits the Oligopolist 
and transactions are real, the STA collects VAT from “m” in order to 
validate the Oligopolist’s credit.
Benefi ts are shown in Table N°4.
As we may see, there are just small changes with respect to the original 
sett ing. The most important changes are the inclusion of “m”’s marginal 
benefi ts and the inclusion of a double fi ne (to the Oligopolist and to “m”) in 
the STA’s expected benefi t if transactions are fake. The latt er is important 
because the DTR is established by law and in this sense the STA may 
bett er control “m”.
This leads us to change the assumption stated in equation (6), now 





   (12)
Now we assume equation (12) holds.
Table N° 4 shows the marginal benefi ts in this extended version
of the game.
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FINDING PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA
Let us fi nd the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this game.
STA’s expected payoff  from choosing A (audit) is:
2 1xP x F M a xP x M a( ) ( ) ( ) ( )               
Notice that STA may now impose a double fi ne, one to the Oligopolist 
and one to “m” in case of fake invoices.
If choosing N (Not audit):
xP x M( )    






























   
(14)
Then, the STA is sure to choose A (audit) according to its information
and the Dishonest Oligopolist (p) would have to choose between 
Purchasing (B) and Not Purchasing (D) from “m”.
Expected Benefi t of Purchasing (B):
1p xP x F M( ) ( ) ( )        
Expected Benefi t of Not Purchasing (D):
1p xP x( ) ( )     
It is clear that B < D then the dishonest Oligopolist will choose D.
With choices D and A, player “m”s expected benefi ts of choosing are:
U = 0
R = 0
Let us assume “m” chooses “U”.
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The profi le (U,D,A) makes 0   
Also making:
0 a
Which contradicts the assumptions, then the evaluation {(U,D,A); 
0 1 1,    } is not a PBE.
Let us assume “m” chooses “R”.
The profi le (R,D,A) makes 0 
Also making:
0 a
Which also contradicts the assumptions, then the evaluation {(R,D,A); 
0 1 1,    } is not a PBE.





   
(15)
Then the STA is sure to choose N (Not audit) and the Dishonest 
Oligopolist has to choose between B and D.
The expected benefi t in case of choosing B is:
1 1p xP x M( ) ( ) ( )          
If choosing D:
1p xP x( ) ( )     
Since we assume (7) is true, then it is clear that B > D; therefore, the 
Oligopolist will choose B.
With decisions (B,N),  1   and 1,   “m”’s expected benefi t in case of 
choosing U is:
p c M( )  
If choosing R:
1 M( ) 















   






REVISTA ENFOQUE-01.indb   32 01/08/2016   9:11:48
Enfoque n.o 1, 2015 33
Value Added Tax: do enforcement mechanisms improve compliance?







It means that “m” will issue unreal or fake invoices when its
expected benefi t of doing it is higher than the ratio of “Honest”
versus “Dishonest” Taxpayers.





   
(18)
But (18) contradicts the assumption stated with equation (12)
Therefore, the evaluation {(U,B,N); 1 1 0,     } is not a PBE.





   
(19)





   
(20)
Equation (20) also contradicts the assumption stated with equation (12). 
Therefore, the evaluation {(R,B,N); 1 1 0,     } is not a PBE.












   
(22)
Therefore, the evaluation {(mixing,B,N); 0 1   } is a PBE if conditions 
(21) and (22) hold. For   small enough, (22) allows (12) to hold.





   
(23)
The STA will choose A with probability expressed by (23)
Dishonest Oligopolist’s expected benefi t in case of choosing B is:
 1 1 1 1p xP x F M xP x M[( ) ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )                  
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If choosing D:
1p xP x( ) ( )     















    
    
     
  
    
(24)
Let us suppose that:
1
1 F
   
 
    
(25)
Equation (25) means that the Dishonest Oligopolist will choose B 
since the probability of auditing is less than the ratio of Oligopolist’s 
expenditures with respect to STA’s revenues in case of fake transactions.
If the Dishonest Oligopolist chooses defi nitely B then “m”’s benefi t in 
case of choosing U is:
 1p c F M c M[( ) ] ( )[( ) ]         
If choosing R:
 1 1 1 1p M M( )( ) ( ) ( ) ]        












( ) ( ), ,
, ,
     
  











( )    

   
(27)
Equation (27) says that “m” chooses “U” if its net benefi t ratio
coming from issuing fake invoices is higher than the ratio of honest-
dishonest taxpayers.
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   
(28)
Which contradicts the assumption stated in equation (12)
Therefore, the evaluation {(U,B,mixing); 1 1 0,     } is not a PBE.





( )    

   
(29)





   (30)
Which also contradicts the assumption stated in equation (12)
Therefore, the evaluation {(R,B,mixing); 1 1 0,     } is not a PBE.





( )    

   
(31)





   
(32)
That for μ small enough allows equation (12) to hold.
Therefore, the evaluation {(mixing,B,mixing); 0 1   } is a PBE 
requiring conditions (25), (31) and (32) to hold.
Let us suppose that:
1
1 F
   
 
    
(33)
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The dishonest Oligopolist choosing D, and the STA mixing
the Profi les (U,D,mixing), (R,D,mixing) and (mixing,D,mixing)
make 0,   it implies:
0a 
Therefore, their related evaluations are not PBE.
Let us suppose that:
1
1 F
   
 
    (34)
The Dishonest Oligopolist is mixing. Then m’s benefi t in case of 
choosing U is:
 1 1 0p c F M c M p[( ) ] ( )[( ) ] ( ){ }             
If choosing R:
 1 1 1 1p M M( )( ) ( ) ( ) ]        












( ) ( ), ,
, ,
     
   
       










( )    

    
(36)
Equation (36) shows that “m” chooses “U” if its net benefi t ratio of 
issuing fake invoices is higher than the ratio of honest-dishonest taxpayers. 
Since the Oligopolist is now mixing the probability “ ”, it is not one like 
in equation (26).





   
(37)
Which contradicts the assumption stated in equation (12)
Therefore, the evaluation {(U,mixing,mixing); 1 1 0,     } is
not a PBE.
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( )    

    
(38)
The profi le (R,mixing,mixing) makes 0  or that:
0a   (39)
Which contradicts the initial assumptions.
Therefore, the evaluation {(R,mixing,mixing); 1 1 0,     }
is not a PBE.





( )    

    
(40)





   
(41)
For μ small enough it allows equation (12) to hold.
Therefore, the evaluation {(mixing,mixing,mixing); 0 1   } is a PBE 
requiring conditions (34), (40) and (41) to hold.
Consequently, we have 3 possible PBE in this game. Let us analyze them:
The fi rst PBE is the evaluation {(mixing,B,N); 0 1   } which means 
that fi rm “m” randomizes on issuing fake and real invoices, the Dishonest 
Oligopolist chooses to purchase from “m” and the STA chooses not to 
audit, then this PBE requires that:
The expected benefi t of issuing fake invoices for “m” is equal to the 






The expected amount of fake credit to be audited is smaller than the 






This equilibrium predicts that if the expected benefi t of issuing fake 
invoices for “m” is equal to the ratio of honest versus dishonest taxpayers, 
it becomes an incentive to evade for “m”. In other words, if there are 
enough evaders in the market making the ratio lower, a particular fi rm 
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like “m” would be more inclined to evade or there would be more fi rms 
like “m” inclined to evade.
This result is not as bad as the one obtained in the original sett ing; 
not only since the collusion cost may play a new and major role in m’s 
choice, but also by the possibility of improving compliance by using other 
alternative measures.
If the STA can directly or indirectly increase “c” in order to reduce m’s 
net benefi t of evading, this negative result may be eventually avoided. 
However, increasing the collusion cost may have worse eff ects on 
compliance in the long term as we pointed out before.
Nevertheless, a kind of “behavioral” factor plays a major role here. 
Indeed, “m” is inclined to evade when it looks that most taxpayers evade. 
Alternative policy rules like school education for kids on the benefi ts of 
taxation, improving the communication with taxpayers or even bett er just 
simplifying the system would obtain much bett er results in the long-run 
aggregate behavior of taxpayers as stated by Alm (2012) and displayed 
before in the literature review.
Finally, if the expected amount of fake credit to be audited is smaller 
than the cost / benefi t ratio of the audit, the STA would choose not to 
audit. Nevertheless, since we assume that (12) holds, it means that the 
double fi ne would induce the STA to consider an audit profi table  enough 
to assign at least a small probability to its choice of audit; this idea conveys 
us to a necessary equilibrium refi nement.
The second PBE is the evaluation {(mixing,B,mixing); 0 1   } which 
means that the fi rm “m” randomizes on issuing fake and real invoices, 
the Dishonest Oligopolist chooses to purchase from “m” and the STA 
randomizes on auditing or not; this PBE requires that:
The net rate of return of issuing fake invoices for “m” is equal to the 





( )    

 
The audit probability is smaller than the ratio of net margin after 
buying fake invoices / margin plus fi ne:
1
1 F
   
 
  
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The expected amount of fake credit to be audited is equal to the cost / 






This equilibrium predicts that “m” will randomize on issuing or not 
fake invoices or that there exist fi rms like “m” issuing fake invoices and 
others issuing real invoices at the same time. The dishonest Oligopolist will 
defi nitely buy from “m” when “m” issues fake invoices or all Oligopolists 
willing to evade will purchase from fi rms like “m” when they issue fake 
invoices. Finally, the STA will randomize on auditing or not.
There is space for STA’s policies in this environment too; e.g., if the 
STA is able to fi x a high enough fi ne “F” even a small fi xed probability 
of audit may induce the dishonest Oligopolist to avoid purchasing fake 
invoices. However, as Alm (2012) has pointed out, most empirical studies 
have found that compliance increases, but only slightly with increases in 
the fi ne rate on unpaid taxes.
On the other hand, the same behavioral factor mentioned in the fi rst 
PBE is also important in m’s choice.
As in the fi rst equilibrium, the dishonest Oligopolist’s defi nite choice 
of “B” appears not to be optimal when the STA is assigning a positive 
probability to audit, then this equilibrium may also be analyzed with a 
stricter concept or a PBE’s refi nement.
The third PBE is the evaluation {(mixing,mixing,mixing);
0 1   } which means that fi rm “m” randomizes on issuing fake and 
real invoices, the Dishonest Oligopolist randomizes on buying and not 
buying fake invoices from “m”, and the STA randomizes on auditing or 
not. Alternatively, it means that some percentage of fi rms like “m” chooses 
to evade and some percentage of the Oligopolists, even willing to evade, 
chooses not to do it. This PBE requires that:
The net rate of return of issuing fake invoices for “m” is equal to the 





( )    

  
The audit probability is equal to the ratio of net margin after purchasing 
fake invoices / margin plus fi ne:
1
1 F
   
 
  
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The expected amount of fake credit to be audited is equal to the cost / 






As in the other equilibria there is also space for STA’s policies in this 
environment; the dishonest Oligopolist’s decision of acting strategically 
to the randomization of “m” and the STA is what makes it more complete.
This Oligopolist’s choice is a bett er response to small deviations from 
optimal decisions of the other players. Indeed, it defi nitely fulfi lls stricter 
requirements of equilibria than that of choosing “B”.
TREMBLING HAND PERFECTION
In a PBE each player’s equilibrium strategy is the best response to the 
other Player’s strategies. However, a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium 
(THPE) additionally imposes that the PBE should be robust to small 
perturbations (or mistakes) in the strategies played by other players. 
Hence, a THPE equilibrium is robust to an arbitrarily small and strictly 
positive probability that other players play other pure strategies, that each 
player’s equilibrium strategy is still the best response to other players’ 
perturbed strategies.
By defi nition any completely mixed strategy which is a PBE is
always THPE.
Let us refi ne our former three PBE to fi nd out if any or some of
them are THPE.
The fi rst PBE is the evaluation {(mixing,B,N); 0 1   }
Dishonest Oligopolist’s optimal choice when the STA chooses “N” 
and “m” is mixing is “B”. However, since (12) is an assumption, the STA 
would be bett er off  by assigning at least a minimal, but strictly positive 
probability to its audit (A) choice when the Oligopolist is choosing “B” 
and “m” is mixing. Thus, STA’s defi nite choice of “N” is not optimal and 
this evaluation is not a THPE.
The second PBE is the evaluation {(mixing,B,mixing); 0 1   }
Dishonest Oligopolist’s optimal choice when “m” is mixing would be 
“B”. However, since STA is also mixing, the Oligopolist would be bett er off  
by assigning at least a minimal, but strictly positive probability to its Not 
purchasing (D) choice. Thus, the dishonest Oligopolist’s defi nite choice of 
“B” is not optimal and this evaluation is not a THPE, either.
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The third PBE is the evaluation {(mixing,mixing,mixing); 0 1   }
Since by defi nition a completely mixed strategy which is a PBE is 
always THPE, this is the only THPE of the extended game.
In this equilibrium, the dishonest Oligopolist is bett er off  by assigning 
at least a minimal, but strictly positive probability to its Not purchasing 
(D) choice, he is acting strategically to the strategies used  by “m” and 
the STA, and each of these two are also acting strategically to the other 
players’ strategies.
Here “m” is looking at its net rate of return in comparison with the 
behavior of all taxpayers in the market; the dishonest Oligopolist is 
evaluating the probability of being audited, and the STA evaluates the 
expected profi tability of auditing.
CONCLUSIONS
Adequate VAT’s collection and additional enforcement mechanisms like 
DTR would assure VAT’s compliance when working together. However, 
gett ing a complete coverage in VAT’s collection is diffi  cult in a highly 
heterogeneous market like the Peruvian market. Therefore, we have 
reasons to believe that it would be benefi cial to require the DTR to all 
taxpayers under VAT’s scope.
If VAT’s evasion from fi rms like “m” is as simple as it appears to be, 
many of them will choose not to report the DTR and the STA may legally 
fi ne and even close them defi nitely. On the contrary, if they choose to 
deliver the DTR they will have to evaluate again their net benefi ts. When 
fi rm “m” is required to deliver the DTR (forced to play) the eff ectiveness 
of the STÁs policies increases considerably even though  recent literature 
shows that fi nes and punishments are not as eff ective as the Allingham 
and Sandmo’s portfolio approach suggests.
It is clear that in the reduced version of the model the only Equilibrium 
Profi le (B,N) provides litt le room for STA’s policies. On the other hand, 
equilibrium in the extended version implies that fi rm “m” and the 
Oligopolist evaluate their decisions regarding collusion costs, fi nes, the 
audit probability and the ratio of honest versus dishonest taxpayers. 
There is now enough space for using common policies and, even bett er, 
other institutional measures like education, mass communication or tax
reforms oriented to simplify the system as powerful instruments to 
disincentive evaders.
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Concretely, the proposal of requiring the DTR to all taxpayers under 
VAT’s scope appears to be faster and cheaper than implementing a 
complete and more accurate tax collection to the large number of medium 
and small-sized fi rms in the Peruvian market. The most important lesson 
of this article is that partially sett led enforcement mechanisms may be not 
only useless, but also harmful to improve compliance.
It is necessary to remember, as we pointed out before, that no references 
to economic effi  ciency or distortions caused by enforcement mechanisms 
are implied in this article. Indeed, barriers to access to the market, as
those pointed out by Auriol and Warlters (2005) may stimulate
underground economy and have been extensively studied in recent 
literature. Certainly, both theoretical and empirical eff ects of VAT’s 
enforcement mechanisms on effi  ciency could be studied later as
a manner of improving this partial eff ort.
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